Redazione. I Working Papers della Collana costituiscono un servizio atto a fornire la tempestiva divulgazione dei risultati dell'attività di ricerca, siano essi in forma provvisoria o definitiva. 
Introduction and literature review
The new open skies agreements between the U.S. and Europe and future liberalization of air markets foster the competition between major airports. In particular, the removal of entry barriers on intercontinental flights has increased competition between alliances and individual hubs. The need to attract new traffic has led airports to compete for indirect connections within individual O-D markets; passengers now have a meaningful choice of intermediate airports when planning their itineraries. The competitive structure of hubs is therefore of great interest to both operators and airport regulators at the national and international levels.
Competition between airports
Competition between airports can take different forms and may not be easy to measure, according to studies commissioned by the European Commission (ATG, 2002) . On the one hand, neighboring airports compete to attract passengers whose travels originate or terminate in the region. The extent of an airport's catchment area can vary greatly, depending on several parameters such as accessibility. On the other hand, competition is influenced by the structure of the airport network.
Following liberalization of the air transport market, carriers spread (see Spiller, 1989; Zhang, 1996; Oum et al., 1995) hub-and-spoke networks: flights from different origins to the same destination or from the same origin to different destinations are concentrated by passing through intermediate nodes defined as hubs. Borenstein (1989) discusses the economic factors and competitive dynamics that push carriers to opt for a hub-and-spoke structure (Caves et al., 1984; Oum et al., 1995) .
Low-cost carriers are the exception to this rule, operating a decentralized network of point-to-point flights of short to medium length. When no direct flight is available between two specific airports, it is often possible to find several alternative routes involving intermediate airports. The major alliances generally offer to coordinate this indirect service for their clients. Alternatively, the passengers themselves can arrange a transfer between two independently operated flights. In the latter case, we speak of opportunities for "self-help hubbing" (see Malighetti et al., 2008) . In both cases, the intermediate airport benefits from an increased number of passengers. For simplicity, in this paper the term "hub" refers to any intermediate airport employed by passengers to reach their final destinations, in both alliance-operated connections and self-help hubbing. 3 
Hub competition
In a simple structure composed of two "spoke" airports, A and B, that connect to each other only through a third hub airport, H, the latter enjoys a monopoly on the A-B market. In reality, the pressure exerted by alliances and independent carriers tends to generate more than one option for the connection between any given airport pair.
Airports therefore have the opportunity to compete for hub roles. The literature shows that this form of competition has become very common in many parts of the world (Rietveld & Brons, 2001 ).
Additional demand from transfer passengers could lead a hub airport to offer more destinations and higher frequencies, which would also benefit passengers originating in the region. From this perspective, hub competition is also relevant to local authorities and regulators. The present work focuses on this competition for indirect traffic.
To be convenient as an intermediate step, the hub airport should generate only a limited increase in terms of distance and travel time compared to a direct connection. These disadvantages are typically offset by higher frequency of service (Butler and Huston, 1990) . A number of in-depth studies on location decisions are present in the literature, testifying to the importance of hub positions in the network (e.g. O'Kelly, 1987; Campbell, 1994) .
Generally, the passenger's choice among paths operated by alternative carriers depends on frequency, price, and many other parameters related to quality (e.g. Bruinsma et al., 2000) .
However, their criteria can be summarized by three main factors. First is the connectivity offered by a specific path; the passenger desires to reach the final destination as speedily as possible. The literature confirms the central role of total travel times and route frequencies in identifying the market share captured by hubs (Hansen, 1990) . The second factor is the total cost of travel, typically dominated by flight fares. The third aspect is quality of service, a concept which includes punctuality, the presence of ancillary services, and congestion in the intermediate airport.
Measures of Hub competition
With reference to hub competition, the literature has developed measures of hub attractiveness based on route frequencies and the number of destinations offered (Reynolds-Feighan and McLay 2006) , the number of connections available within a given time window (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005) , and average waiting times (Rietveld and Browns, 2001; Lin, 2006) . These various measures are useful for establishing benchmarks and comparing airports to each other, but do not indicate 4 which hubs are potential stops for the same pair of origin-destination airports. In other words, existing measures do not determine which airports in the network are actually competing with each other in a given O-D market. Recent and ongoing research by Veldhuis and Burghouwt aims to overcome this shortcoming by developing a generalized cost for passengers, considering several economic factors (Burghouwt and Veldhuis, 2006; Burghouwt, 2007; Burghouwt et al., 2008) .
However, because vast amounts of data and specific assumptions are required to calibrate their model, this generalized cost function has only been applied to individual airports. Our present analysis relies on total travel times, including waiting time at the hub, to detect which intermediate airports can intercept the same origin-destination demand, regardless of the market shares of the different alternatives. We also consider paths involving more than one stop. The competitive positions of potential hubs are always analyzed with reference to a particular origin-destination pair.
While simpler compared to the generalized cost model, this measure does not require calibration and can easily be applied to the entire network.
Methodology and data
The empirical analysis takes into account all scheduled flights between major airports worldwide.
The sample is composed of all 232 airports offering more than 3 million seats in departure flights in 2008. The selected airports account for 75.4% of the total seats offered by more than three thousand airports worldwide, as covered by the Innovata dataset. We account for flight frequency by considering all the quickest connections in the three-day period for a given O-D pair. The same analysis was applied to the European network over the course of a single day by Malighetti et al. (2008) . Because this research concerns the worldwide network, the period is extended from one to three days.
We consider interline transfers only if they occur within the same alliance; otherwise, transfers must occur within the same carrier. We also require a minimum connecting time of 60 minutes for connections within the same country or integrated geographical entity such as the EU. Travel within the EU is considered akin to domestic travel, since people move freely without the need for immigration procedures. In the following, we use domestic (foreign) as related to airports (not) located in the same geographical entity as the intermediate airport. We extend the minimum connection time to 75 minutes for travel from a domestic airport to a foreign destination, including intercontinental airports. We extend the minimum connection time to 90 minutes for travel from a foreign airport to a domestic destination, because of the additional delay due to immigration procedures that take place at the connecting airport. The minimum connecting time of 90 minutes also applies to connections from foreign departures to foreign destinations. In our analysis, the average connecting time at an airport depends on the particular kind of connections it offers. For example, the average connecting time is higher at London Heathrow than at other European airports because Heathrow hosts a higher proportion of long-haul connections.
A hub is competitive when many connections passing through it have travel times close to the quickest alternative. Once we have determined the minimum travel time for each O-D pair, the second step is to compare travel times through a generic hub to the quickest alternative.
The connections considered are those whose travel times do not exceed the quickest alternative by a certain threshold. In this empirical analysis, we adopt a threshold of 20%. If the quickest path connecting airports A and B lasts 10 hours, an alternative path passing through hub H is considered only if its duration is less than or equal to 12 hours.
For each intermediate airport H, we identify all O-D connections meeting this criterion during the three-day study period. Then we calculate the average frequency, the average travel time, the 6 average waiting time at H, and the average routing factor. We also report the average number of steps in the viable O-D connections. These averages are weighted as described in the next section.
In this manner, we identify all the hubs offering competitive O-D connections. We then compare the main competitors in terms of frequency of the O-D connection, travel times, waiting times and routing factors in order to come to a better understanding of their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis is composed of two sections. The first analyzes hub competition worldwide and on specific O-D markets. In the second section, we will show in detail how hub competition 
Hub competition on the major O-D markets
As remarked in the methodology section, this analysis takes into account only O-D connections whose total travel time is no more than 20% longer than the quickest alternative connection (which may or may not be direct). In all analysis, including the averaged performance indicators described below, we weight O-D connections by the total number of departing seats offered by the origin and destination airports. We identified a total of 53.592 viable O-D connections in the global network.
For reasons of space, we shall frequently refer to airports using their 3-digit IATA codes. Appendix A describes all the airports in the sample, indicating each one's extended name, country and city of reference.
In reference to the global network (see row 1 of Table 2 However, with respect to the Europe-Asia market, it has the drawback of lengthening the detour necessary to complete the connection. Its average routing factor is 1.15, where Frankfurt's is 1.13.
The first Asian airport to appear in the ranking is Beijing, in sixth place with a share of 47.1%.
Beijing offers the highest frequency of service over the three-day period, however, at 5. Table 9 reports on hub competition for the market from Latin America to Europe. This market provides a marked example of hub specialization in the Madrid airport. Madrid comes second in the ranking after CDG, with a market share of 66.1% compared to CDG's 67.2%. The Madrid airport has higher waiting times than CDG, by more than 10 minutes on average. The lowest average routing factor (1.07) belongs to Portugal's Lisbon, so this airport has a positioning advantage.
However, Lisbon offers just 2.4 routes per O-D pair over the three-day period, while Paris Charles de Gaulle offers 4.5.
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The last specific market considered is that between North America and Asia (table 10) Table 3 shows whether waiting times or routing factors better explain the overall travel times observed in various markets 1 . In each market, we consider the relative performance of the 30 most important hubs and their main competitors, and report the percentages of airports for which waiting times and routing factors are coherent with overall travel times. That is, if an airport has higher waiting times but lower travel times than its main competitor, we presume that waiting times do not have a major impact on travel times for that airport. If an airport achieves better travel times than its main competitors despite having worse coordination between incoming and outgoing flights, its location may provide a competitive advantage instead (as seen in the average routing factor). Note that it is possible for travel times to be coherent with both factors, or with neither factor. Thus, in some cases the sum of the percentages will not be 100%.
On a global scale and considering only the first competitor, waiting times are coherent with travel times only for 10 of the 30 major hubs (33.3%). 
Conclusion
This work employs an innovative methodology based on minimum travel times to create new measures of hub competition. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, this analysis is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of competition among hubs both on a global scale and in the major origin-destination markets.
We find a high level of competition among major hubs, all of which have at least three other 
